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Eco-social	policies	
	
	
In	the	important	field	of	housing	and	domestic	energy,	this	points	to	two	basic	eco-social	
solutions.	First,	social	energy	tarifs:	introduce	lower	tarifs	for	initial	units	of	electricity	or	
gas	consumed,	and	higher	tarifs	for	successive	units.	This	would	recognize	the	basic	need	
component	of	the	first	block	of	household	energy	and	the	progressive	choice	element	in	
successive	units.	The	total	average	price	of	domestic	energy	would	continue	to	rise	over	
time,	as	part	of	the	carbon	pricing	strategy,	but	the	distribution	of	the	burden	would	be	
skewed	more	to	higher	consumption	households	and	luxury	use	of	energy.	It	would	be	
difficult	to	administer	in	the	privatised	energy	system	of	most	countries	today	and	is	
opposed	by	energy	suppliers.		
	
Second,	and	most	important,	a	massive	rol-out	of	‘Green	New	Deal’	programes		(NEF	
2008).	These	would	reduce	carbon	emissions	by	investing	in	renewable	energy	and	
deploying	radical	conservation	measures,	whilst	boosting	demand	and	employment	
opportunities,	via,	for	example,	creating	and	training	a	‘carbon	army’	of	workers	to	achieve	
the	reconstruction	and	house	retrofitting	programme.	Germany	has	the	most	ambitious	
programme	of	this	kind	in	Europe	(Power	and	Zulauf,	2011).	Yet	the	German	Feed-in	Tarif	
(FiT)	programme	recreates	some	new	distributive	dilemmas:	it	clearly	benefits	the	top	30%	
of	households	and	richer	farmers	(Hüther,	2013).	Given	the	impact	on	general	electricity	
prices	the	overal	impact	remains	regressive.	However,	in	a	dynamic	context,	the	FiT	has	
proved	invaluable	in	retrofitting	houses	and	in	building	up	Germany’s	solar	panel	industry.		
	
In	conclusion,	new	forms	of	triple	injustice	can	be	continualy	recreated	in	unequal	societies.	
To	deal	with	these	a	more	fundamental	strategy	is	required.		
	
3.	Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	
3.1	Consumption	and	welfare	
	
The	distinction	between	a	C1	and	C2	approach	has	paralels	with	national	income	
accounting.	This	seems	counter-intuitive,	given	that	national	income	accounting	is	
notoriously	hopeless	as	a	measure	of	welbeing	and	ignores	the	entire	household	economy,	
civil	society	and	the	stil	broader	‘core	economy’.	However,	national	income	accounting	has	
one	great	merit:	it	provides	three	distinct	methods	for	calculating	the	value	of	an	economy’s	
gross	domestic	product	or	GDP,	which	should	deliver	the	same	answer.	These	methods	are:	
• to	sum	the	monetary	value	added	by	al	enterprises	in	the	economy	
• to	sum	the	incomes	generated	in	the	economy	
• to	sum	expenditures	in	the	economy	on	final	outputs		
	
These	distinct	methods	in	turn	imply	three	distinct	targets	for	public	policy	to	act	upon:	
1. the	quantum	and	eficiency	of	production:	broadly	the	scope	of	economic	policy	
2. the	distribution	of	incomes:	broadly	the	scope	of	social	policy	
3. the	composition	of	consumption:	the	target	of	a	novel	range	of	policies	that	I	wil	
cal	‘recomposition’.		
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The	goals	of	eficiency	and	growth	remain	the	mainstay	of	economic	policy.	After	the	Second	
World	War,	a	‘social	settlement’	in	the	developed	world	qualified	capitalism	with	the	
auxiliary	goal	of	equity	and	redistribution:	the	policy	domain	of	‘welfare	states’.	The	urgent	
need	now	is	for	a	new	social	settlement	adding	a	third	goal:	sustainable	consumption.	This	
would	address	the	composition	of	national	expenditure:	between	private	consumption,	
public	consumption	and	investment,	and	within	each	of	these	categories.	Two	critical	
dimensions	in	this	debate	would	be	the	environmental	impact	of	diferent	expenditures	but	
also	their	‘necessitousness’,	whether	they	are	essential,	desirable	or	wasteful.	This	takes	us	
back	to	need	theory.	
	
This	third	goal	is	not	as	novel	as	it	seems.	In	practice,	post-war	welfare	states	have	been	
more	complex	and	diferentiated	than	the	common	opposition	of	eficiency	and	equity	
implies.	It	is	more	helpful	to	see	social	policy	comprising	three	sets	of	activities,	as	in	Table	2.	
	
Table	2.	Ideal	generic	goals	and	activities	of	social	policy	
Welfare	goals	 Welfare	policies	
S1	Redistribution	of	income	Guarantee	a	minimum	income	floor;	reduce	inequality	
S2	Social	consumption	 Provide	vital	need	satisfiers	and	discourage	‘bads’	
S3	Social	investment		 Develop	human	and	social	capabilities		
Source:	Gough	2017b,	Table	5.1	
	
Alongside	social	transfers	(S1),	social	democratic	welfare	states	deliver	social	consumption	
services	(S2)	and	social	investment	policies	(S3),	which	together	account	for	about	one	half	
of	public	social	expenditure.	In	addition,	unrecognised	by	expenditure	accounts,	there	is	a	
raft	of	other	interventions	relevant	to	meeting	needs,	such	as	labour	market	policies	of	al	
kinds	and	regulatory	policies	impacting	firms,	households	and	other	actors.	Despite	ongoing	
cuts,	privatisation,	contracting	out,	commodification	and	deregulation,	welfare	states	
continue	to	provide,	finance	and	regulate	for	an	alternative,	broadly	needs-based	delivery	of	
money,	services	and	capabilities.	Thus,	right	from	the	start	we	can	note	that	social	policy	is	
heavily	involved	in	recomposing	consumption	(C2).	
	
I	am	proposing	an	expansion	of	public	debate	and	intervention	around	private	consumption.	
This	is	a	more	radical	step.	It	appears	to	chalenge	a	basic	freedom	of	modern	consumer	
societies.	It	chalenges	a	fundamental	principle	of	welfare	economics,	that	individuals	are	
the	best	judges	of	their	own	preferences	or	wants,	and	that	what	is	consumed	should	be	
determined	by	the	private	consumption	preferences	of	individuals.	It	immediately	raises	
concerns	about	interference	by	experts,	oficials	or	politicians	in	the	intimate	lives	of	
citizens.	How	can	such	a	programme	be	envisaged	in	a	democratic	society?		
	
A	starting	point	is	to	recognise	the	lack	of	realism	of	the	orthodox	economic	theory	of	
consumers	as	rational	and	informed	individuals	with	ordered	sets	of	preferences	
uninfluenced	by	external	factors.	This	model	has	long	been	rejected	by	behavioural	
economics	that	recognises	gaps	in	knowledge,	the	importance	of	inertia	and	the	role	of	
‘satisficing’	in	consumer	behaviour	and	thus	countenances	‘nudging’	and	changes	in	choice	
architecture	to	alter	consumers’	incentives	and	behaviour.	But	this	too	is	insuficient.	
Sociologists	have	shown	that	behaviours	are	shaped	by	wider	‘social	practices’,	such	as	daily	
showering	or	patterns	of	food	purchasing,	reflecting	diferent	identities	and	social	norms.	
Beyond	these	are	political	economy	explanations	that	recognise	the	pervasive	power	of	
corporations	and	advertising	to	engineer	novel	and	ever-expanding	consumption	
commodities.	And	finaly,	there	are	stil	broader	systems	of	provision,	such	as	the	spatial	lay-
out	of	cities,	largely	outside	the	scope	of	consumer	influence.	
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It	is	not	surprising	that	by	contrast	many	writers	on	sustainable	consumption	speak	of	‘an	
iron	cage	of	consumerism’	imprisoning	consumers	(Jackson	2009).	This	is	too	strong	an	
image:	new	market	players	can	enter	and	generational	shifts	in	tastes	can	occur.	But	there	
can	be	no	doubt	that	corporate	power,	system	‘lock-in’	and	the	interaction	between	the	two	
profoundly	undermine	the	neo-classical	justification	for	untrammeled	consumer	behaviour.	
This	is	increasingly	recognised	in	contemporary	policy	areas,	such	as	the	public	provision	and	
regulation	of	medical	services,	and	the	blitzkrieg	of	regulations,	taxes	and	shaming	that	
surrounds	smoking	today.	
	 	
3.2	Making	the	case	for	a	‘consumption	corridor’	
	
Now	the	imperative	need	to	restrain	and	reverse	environmental	degradation	has	brought	
consumption	back	onto	the	agenda.	To	recompose	consumption	fairly	entails	making	a	
distinction	between	goods	and	services	that	are	necessary	for	a	basic	level	of	welbeing,	and	
those	that	are	surplus	to	this	requirement.	By	prioritising	the	former,	need	theory	provides	
a	bridge	to	relate	social,	global	and	intergenerational	justice	(Gough	2015a).	To	achieve	a	
safe	and	just	space	for	humanity	requires	addressing	not	only	basic	needs,	minimum	
incomes	and	necessities,	but	also	riches,	luxuries	and	maximum	incomes.	In	the	language	of	
Giulio	and	Fuchs	(2014),	we	must	pursue	the	idea	of	a	sustainable	‘consumption	corridor’	
between	minimum	standards,	alowing	every	individual	to	live	a	satisfactory	life,	and	
maximum	standards,	ensuring	a	limit	on	every	individual’s	use	of	natural	and	social	
resources	in	order	to	guarantee	a	good	life	for	others	in	the	present	and	in	the	future.	I	wil	
look	at	each	in	turn.	
	
A	decent	minimum	consumption	standard.	Social	policy	research	provides	us	with	a	sound	
basis	for	identifying	necessities	in	any	particular	social	context.	Since	Peter	Townsend’s	work	
on	poverty	(1979),	there	has	been	wide	acceptance	that	inability	to	participate	in	accepted	
social	activities	is	the	defining	feature	of	poverty	or	social	exclusion.	But	what	participation	
entails	wil	be	conceived,	specified	and	measured	diferently	in	diferent	societies.	This	can	
be	identified	using	citizen	focus	groups	advised	by	various	‘experts’.	For	example,	the	2014	
MIS	(Minimum	Income	Standard)	study	in	the	UK	involved	12	focus	groups	in	which	
members	of	the	public	from	a	range	of	social	backgrounds	were	tasked	with	producing	lists	
of	items	that	households	would	need	in	order	to	reach	‘an	acceptable	minimum	standard	of	
living’.	An	impressive	consensus	has	built	up	on	what	this	consumption	bundle	consists	of.	
The	dual	strategy	methodology	is	now	being	overtly	applied	to	estimate	‘decent	living’	
standards	across	many	EU	member	states	(Storms	2013;	Gough	2017,	chapter	7).	
	
Devising	a	maximum	income	line:	defining	luxuries.	Herman	Daly	(1977)	was	an	early	
advocate	of	instituting	a	maximum	income	as	part	of	a	steady	state	economy,	an	idea	he	
continues	to	repeat:	‘If	you	have	a	limited	total,	and	you	also	have	a	minimum	income,	then	
that	implies	a	maximum	somewhere’	(Daly	2018:	90).	Since	then	cals	for	a	maximum	
income	or	‘riches	line’	have	grown	though	often	without	a	coherent	ethical	or	sociological	
basis.	But	new	thinking	among	political	philosophers,	sustainability	economists	and	others	is	
gradualy	emerging.	Ingrid	Robeyns	(2018),	for	example,	makes	the	case	for	a	‘non-intrinsic	
limitarianism’	–	the	belief	that	it	is	not	permissible	to	have	more	resources	than	are	needed	
to	fuly	flourish	in	life.	To	justify	this	she	considers	three	arguments:	the	arguments	of	unmet	
urgent	needs,	of	democracy	and	legitimacy,	and	of	ecological	sustainability.	I	wil	consider	
each	in	turn.	
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First,	riches	should	not	be	accrued	at	the	expense	of	unmet	basic	needs.	Medeiros’s	(2006)	
redistributive	method	to	calculate	a	maximum	income	line	elegantly	operationalises	this	
principle.	Beginning	with	the	minimum	income	line	it	calculates	a	riches	line	‘which	delimits	
the	accumulated	resources	necessary	for	the	eradication	of	poverty’.	It	calculates	what	sum	
of	money	it	would	take	to	move	everyone	above	the	acceptable	income	threshold,	and	then	
considers	at	what	salary	al	higher	earnings	would	provide	that	sum.	Using	this	method	a	
recent	estimate	for	the	UK	by	Hirsch	(2017)	arrives	at	a	riches	line	of	about	£150,000	per	
person	per	year.	If	al	incomes	above	this	rate	were	taxed	at	100%	the	money	raised	would	
be	suficient	to	bring	al	UK	citizens	up	to	the	‘minimum	income	standard’	–	a	needs-based	
standard	considerably	higher	than	the	oficial	poverty	line.	This	has	some	intuitive	
plausibility:	it	is	the	income	at	which	the	top	rate	of	tax	commences,	and	is	the	salary	of	the	
UK	Prime	Minister.		
	
The	second	argument	for	establishing	a	maximum	limit	would	require	a	more	democratic,	
colaborative	and	disaggregated	approach	to	defining	luxuries.	It	would	apply	the	dual	
strategy	method	to	discussing	conditions	for	flourishing	in	a	specific	national	context.	
Planned	research	projects	tend	to	focus	on	size	of	home,	material	goods	in	the	home,	
savings/insurance,	leisure	activities,	type	of	car	and	possible	life	choices.	Citizen	forums	
comprising	diferent	income	groups	and	classes	would	be	tasked	with	reaching	a	consensus	
on	what	bundle	of	goods	and	services	would	enable	a	flourishing	or	prosperous	life.	If	this	
can	be	agreed,	then	we	could	identify	a	maximum	bundle	and	a	maximum	income/wealth	
line	above	this	level.	Such	possessions	would	be	seen	as	luxuries	and	riches	and	would	be	
seen	to	lack	legitimacy.2		
	
For	our	purposes	it	is	the	third	test	which	is	crucial:	what	bundle	of	consumer	commodities	
contributing	to	flourishing	or	prosperity	would	be	possible	within	current	planetary	
boundaries?	For	example,	what	consumption	levels	and	patterns	would	stay	within	a	safe	
emissions	level?	To	determine	this	level	a	more	demanding	dual	strategy	would	be	needed,	
whereby	sustainability	experts	provide	indicators	of	the	carbon	and	GHG	footprints	of	
diferent	consumption	items	to	inform	and	guide	citizen	discussions	on	what	was	and	was	
not	acceptable.	It	is	highly	likely	that	this	ecological	maximum	limit	would	lie	below,	possibly	
wel	below,	both	the	redistributive	and	the	legitimacy	limits	discussed	above.	
	
To	devise	and	implement	a	luxury	or	riches	line	is	a	demanding	task	for	many	reasons.	To	
move	to	2	tonnes	of	emissions	within	existing	socio-technical	structures	would	deprive	
citizens	of	a	vast	range	of	goods	and	services	-	cars,	imported	foods,	a	range	of	clothing	and	
diets	etc	-	that	they	have	agreed	are	necessary	for	efective	participation	in	modern	life.	In	
Finland,	even	people	receiving	minimum	income	benefits	exceed	ecologicaly	sustainable	
lifestyles	by	a	wide	margin	(Hirvilammi	et	al	2013).	This	is	to	be	expected:	C2	policies	
complement	but	don’t	replace	C1	policies.		
3.3	Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	
	
Initiatives	to	recompose	consumption	wil	necessarily	be	colective	and	there	is	growing	
evidence	that	these	wil	be	most	successful	in	sub-national	communities,	whether	cities,	
towns	or	vilages.	Meaningful	participation	within	localities	encourages	longer-term	and	
joined–up	thinking,	bringing	together	singular	technologies	to	provide	‘transformative	
networks	of	innovation’	(Steward	2012;	Jackson	and	Victor	(2013).	Decarbonising	our	
																												
2	We	intend	to	begin	pilot	studies	in	2019	to	test	whether	this	is	the	case.	
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economies	and	our	way	of	life	can	never	be	achieved	by	simply	new	technology:	it	requires	a	
network	of	transformations	that	are	more	readily	conceived	and	perceived	on	a	smaler	
human	scale,	such	as	CRAGs	(Carbon	Rationing	Action	Groups)	and	transition	towns	in	the	
UK	(Howel,	2012;	Whitmarsh,	2011,	Seyfang	and	Haxeltine	2013).	
But	in	view	of	overwhelming	power	imbalances,	consumption	lock-in	and	growing	
inequality,	it	is	evident	that	recomposing	consumption	wil	require,	in	addition,	some	hefty	
top-down	state	interventions.	It	wil	need	a	range	of	novel	C2	programmes	to	recompose	
consumption	in	a	fair	way:	an	enlarged	suite	of	‘eco-social	policies’	that	simultaneously	and	
explicitly	pursue	both	equity/justice	and	sustainability/	suficiency	goals.	These	are	discussed	
in	detail	in	my	book	(Gough	2017b).	I	highlight	just	three	here:	smart	VAT,	wider	social	
consumption,	and	reduced	work-time.	
Taxing	high-carbon	luxuries:	smart	value-added	tax.	In	al	OECD	countries	except	the	USA	
there	exists	an	explicit	tax	on	consumption—value-added	tax	(VAT)—that	raises	about	a	fifth	
of	al	tax	revenues	and	is	a	major	funder	of	social	programmes.	The	VAT	rate	in	most	EU	
countries	today	varies	between	20%	and	25%,	but	in	al	countries	there	are	exemptions	and	
lower	rates	applied	to	certain	goods	and	services.	The	argument	for	a	‘smart	VAT’	is	to	
introduce	deliberate	variations	in	the	rate,	higher	to	discourage	bad	consumption	and	lower	
to	encourage	desirable	consumption	(Fel	2016).	The	proposal	has	mainly	been	advocated	
on	health	and	wel-being	grounds,	to	improve	healthy	eating	and	discourage	obesity.	But	it	
could	also	be	amended	to	take	account	of	sustainability.	Thus	high-GHG	goods	that	harmed	
wel-being	would	attract	the	highest	VAT	rates,	while	low-carbon	goods	that	improve	wel-
being	would	be	taxed	at	lower	or	even	negative	rates	(amounting	to	a	subsidy).	To	decide	
what	goods	are	virtuous	and	what	harmful	Fel	proposes	regular	deliberative	dialogue	in	
focus	groups	informed	by	environmental	and	social	experts.	Smart	VAT	provides	a	broad	
framework	within	which	other	proposals	to	tax	high-carbon	non-essentials	could	fit,	such	as	
a	frequent	flyer	levy	or	a	global	tax	on	business-class	flights	(Chancel	and	Piketty	2014).	
	
Widening	social	consumption.	There	are	several	reasons	for	raising	the	share	of	state	social	
consumption	as	part	of	an	eco-social	strategy.	First,	tax-financed	social	consumption	such	as	
health	services,	social	care	and	education	is	inherently	redistributive:	alocation	according	to	
need,	risk	or	citizenship,	not	market	demand,	automaticaly	serves	redistributive	social	
goals—even	if	the	tax	system	is	neutral	rather	than	progressive.	Second,	research	suggests	
that	this	saves	carbon.	For	example,	the	US	healthcare	system	directly	accounts	for	8%	of	
emissions	in	the	USA,	compared	with	3%	of	UK	emissions	directly	stemming	from	the	NHS.	
This	is	due	both	to	the	greater	macro-eficiency	and	lower	expenditure	shares	of	health	in	
the	UK,	but	also	to	lower	emissions	per	pound	or	dolar	spent,	due	to	better	alocation	of	
resources	and	procurement	practices	and	to	explicit	carbon-saving	programmes	(Gough	
2017b).3	
	
Reducing	paid	work	time.	A	redistribution	of	time	would	contribute	to	recomposing	
consumption	and	deliver	eco-social	benefits.	It	would	enhance	‘discretionary	time’	-	time	
left	over	after	the	necessary	time	spent	in	wage	labour,	unpaid	household	labour	and	
personal	care	-	and	contribute	to	autonomy	and	welbeing	(Goodin	et	al	2008).	Moreover	
evidence	is	growing	that	RWT	can	make	a	major	contribution	to	a	sustainable	environment	
																												
3	The	idea	of	Universal	Basic	Services	generalizes	this	approach,	though	not	on	carbon	
grounds	(IGP	2017).	There	is	a	case	for	public	provision	or	guarantees	of	access	for	a	wider	
range	of	life’s	necessities,	beyond	the	staples	of	the	welfare	state,	including	for	example	
food,	housing	and	transport.	This,	rather	than	Universal	Basic	Income,	would	contribute	to	
sustainability	and	greater	equality	(and	eficiency).	
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and	climate	(Schor	2005,	Coote	and	Franklin	2013;	Gough	2017b).	Since	1975,	when	they	
had	similar	hours	of	work,	the	US	has	reduced	average	hours	by	4	per	cent	and	Germany	by	
22	per	cent.	Al	other	things	being	equal,	Germany	has	deployed	its	productivity	dividend	in	
a	less	environmentaly	harmful	way	than	the	United	States.	RWT	achieves	this	in	two	ways:	it	
can	change	the	time	and	expenditure	budgets	of	households	in	a	lower-carbon	direction	
(the	composition	efect)	and	it	weakens	the	‘work	and	spend’	cycle,	which	locks	employees	
into	a	trajectory	of	fixed	hours	and	rising	consumption	(the	scale	efect).	Both	contribute	to	
our	C2	goal	and	the	latter	provides	a	transition	to	the	C3	goal.	But	both	need	to	be	
accompanied	by	supportive	economic,	labour	and	social	policies	to	ensure	that	lower-
income	households	do	not	sufer,	that	the	transition	is	fair.	
	
One	way	or	another,	the	composition	of	consumption	must	enter	political	debate	and	the	
policy	arsenal	in	an	explicit	way.	Social	policy	should	not	be	concerned	only	with	equity	and	
distributive	issues.	In	the	age	of	the	Anthropocene,	social	policy	must	be	about	changing	
patterns	of	consumption	as	wel	as	redistributing	incomes.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Green	growth,	or	raising	eco-eficiency,	wil	not	sufice	in	the	face	of	dangerous	climate	
change	for	two	reasons:	it	cannot	succeed	alone	in	reducing	the	cumulative	stock	of	
greenhouse	gases	fast	enough	and	it	pays	little	or	no	attention	to	issues	of	fairness	and	
justice,	either	between	countries	or	within	countries.	This	chapter	reverts	to	a	concept	in	the	
Brundtland	Report	on	sustainable	development	–	that	of	common	human	needs	–	which	I	
argue	provides	the	crucial	foundation	for	a	just	transition	to	a	sustainable	low-carbon	world.	
After	establishing	a	theoretical	framework	to	define	and	operationalise	human	needs,	the	
first	section	concludes	by	distinguishing	three	very	broad	strategies	within	rich	countries	to	
limit	climate	change	in	a	just	way:	fair	eco-eficiency,	fair	sustainable	consumption,	and	fair	
degrowth.	This	chapter	focuses	only	on	the	first	two.	The	second	part	introduces	inequality,	
to	reflect	the	influence	of	the	rising	inequality	of	income	and	wealth	on	the	distribution	of	
consumption-based	emissions	between	and	within	countries;	a	phenomenon	some	have	
labeled	the	Plutocene.	This	environment	intensifies	certain	dilemmas	between	the	goals	of	
justice/equity	and	sustainability,	which	require	new	forms	of	eco-social	policy	to	overcome.	
	
The	third	section	makes	the	case	for	‘recomposing	consumption’	by	returning	to	need	
theory.	Necessities	can	be	distinguished	from	luxuries	and	this	enables	us	to	envisage	and	
target	a	fair	‘consumption	corridor’	between	minimum	and	maximum	consumption	levels.	
To	achieve	this	in	a	democratic	society,	I	argue,	wil	require	new	forms	of	deliberative	citizen	
forums	caling	upon	expert	advice.	To	this	end	three	further	eco-social	policies	are	
advocated	to	shift	rich	countries	towards	more	sustainable	consumption	practices.	None	of	
this	wil	be	easy,	but	recomposing	consumption	in	rich	countries	could	provide	a	strategic	
and	more	just	bridge	between	a	dangerous	present	and	the	seemingly	impossible	future	of	
degrowth.	
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Practical	proposals	
1. Establish	a	public	statutory	body	independent	of	government	with	the	remit	to	pursue	
sustainable	and	socialy	just	practices,	monitor	policy	formation	across	departments,	and	
evaluate	and	publicly	comment	on	progress	and	its	obstacles.	How	to	do	this	wil	vary	
and	we	need	cross-national	studies	here.	
From	a	UK	perspective	this	could	be	based	on	the	Sustainable	Development	Commission	
(SDC),	abolished	in	2010.	Other	UK	models	are	the	UK	Climate	Change	Committee,	the	
Equalities	and	Human	Rights	Commission,	and	the	Welsh	Commission	for	Future	
Generations.	
2. To	achieve	equitable	and	just	eco-eficiency	(C1):	
a. Bring	back	into	plural	forms	of	colective	ownership	(state,	municipal,	
cooperative	etc)	al	privatised	basic	utilities,	including	energy	and	water.	
b. Revamp	Green	New	Deal	proposals	starting	with	social	housing,	low	eficiency	
housing	and	housing	in	deprived	areas.	
c. Introduce	social	tarifs	for	energy	and	water.	
3. Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	(C2):	
a. Expand	the	scope	and	extent	of	public	service	delivery	of	basic	need	services.	
Aim	for	Universal	Basic	Services	as	an	alternative	vision	to	Universal	Basic	
Income	
b. Establish	deliberative	citizen	forums	to	try	to	achieve	consensus	on	a)	
sustainable	maximum	incomes,	b)	sustainable	maximum	bundles	of	consumer	
goods	
c. Introduce	smart	VAT	with	higher	rates	on	unsustainable	luxuries	
d. Facilitate	and	encourage	through	colective	bargaining	and	individual	options	
opportunities	to	reduce	paid	work	time	
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